Loan as a Durable Good and Bank Indirect-Tax Incidence by Soldatos, Gerasimos T. & Varelas, Erotokritos
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Loan as a Durable Good and Bank
Indirect-Tax Incidence
Gerasimos T. Soldatos and Erotokritos Varelas
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67588/
MPRA Paper No. 67588, posted 5. December 2015 14:25 UTC
 Loan as a Durable Good and Bank Indirect-Tax Incidence 
Gerasimos T. Soldatos1 & Erotokritos Varelas2 
 
1American University of Athens, Greece                                                                                    
2University of Macedonia, Greece                                                                                             
Corresponsence: Gerasimos T. Soldatos, American University of Athens, Greece. E-mail: 
soldgera@yahoo.com 
Forthcoming in: International Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 7(1) 
Abstract 
This paper maintains that the durable-goods character of loans enables the forward shift of bank 
indirect taxes à la Coase (1972), increasing thereby the money multiplier and reducing the equity-
lending ratio regardless bank industry structure. Consequently, policymakers may use such taxes 
countercyclically if, of course, the need for depositor insurance is not exaggerated evoking upon the 
problems of asymmetric information accompanying lending. Also, the “standard” proposition that the 
ability to shift indirect taxation forward depends negatively on the size of the elasticity of loan demand, 
is confirmed here, too. The low elasticity of loan demand is related with relationship banking, 
contemplating thereby that the mix “bank indirect tax-relationship banking” may prove to be critical 
for capital accumulation and growth depending on the dissemination of such banking. A zero-bank-
profit policy is proposed as a stabilization policy beyond the countercyclical manipulation of the tax.  
Keywords: Loan life, Bank indirect-tax incidence, Bank market power, Quantity competition, Capital 
accumulation 
1. Introduction 
Contrary to what authors like Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2010),  Caminal (2003), Chiorazzo and 
Milani (2011), and  Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999, 2001) maintain,  Cappele-Blancard and 
Havrylchyk (2013a, b) retort that a tax on bank profit cannot be shifted forward to customers, because 
it does not affect the optimization problem of the bank. And, they become the first to tackle the issue of 
the incidence of a bank tax as an indirect rather than corporate income tax. Through a Cournot version 
of the Monti-Klein model and empirical analysis of the Hungarian bank tax, they confirm the 
conventional wisdom that in an oligopolistic market, the ability to shift forward indirect taxation 
depends negatively on the size of the elasticity of demand (see e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf 2002, and 
Konrad et al. 2014). But, when the question of indirect tax incidence comes to bank asset taxes, it 
should not be ignored that what banks sell is a durable good, since loans is what they sell, and loans 
need time to be paid off, with the installments being really rents and some part of the loan remaining 
unpaid before maturity date. And, when one goes over the also scarce literature on indirect taxation and 
market power in the oligopolistic environment of the durable goods industry (see e.g. Goering and 
Boyce 1996), the following Coase-type (1972) argument might be advanced with regard to banks:  
Borrowers anticipate that the bank will have an incentive to reduce future interest rates due to either a 
rightward shift of the supply curve of loans under prosperity conditions or a leftward shift of the 
demand curve for loans under recessionary conditions. This reduces the value of current loans, which 
loans however are already held by borrowers, and which value reduction need not be taken thereby into 
account by the bank when formulating its future pricing strategy unless it is explicitly stated in the loan 
contract. Rational individuals, who wish to borrow now, will take this into consideration, inducing 
subsequently the bank to act accordingly through marginal cost pricing unless the life span of the loan 
is small enough to be disassociated from future pricing decisions. That is, the bank can exercise its 
market power and earn positive profit only if borrower rationality is somehow disturbed. And, a bank 
tax can be such a disturbance factor within the context of course of oligopolistic banking: The bank can 
simply ascribe the levy of a higher interest on the presence of the tax, in which case part of the profit 
may be seen as coming out of a tax shift. At the same time, the bank can lend the tax money saved 
through the shift, driving the interest rate down, which borrowers can “guess” too, ameliorating bank 
market power to shift the tax. The extent of the shift depends on the interplay of these two trends.1  
The various plans for additional bank taxation following the Lehman brothers’ crisis in 2009, is a 
development conferring to a study in bank indirect tax incidence even more importance. These have 
 been plans which according to the European Commission’s Eurobarometer (No. 75, 2011) are looked 
upon favorably by 81 percent of Europeans. Their implementation would undoubtedly offset the 
possible economic rents conferred to the financial sector by the explicit and inexplicit state support to it 
(see e.g. Chaudhry and Mullineux 2014). But, there does exist ability to shift the taxes, and this is a 
subject that should be researched in more detail given that what is known for sure is only that the tax 
shift will hurt more seriously small firms and households. The redistributive effect of any taxation is 
expected and is defined to be the content of tax incidence, indeed (Pearce, 1986, p. 192). Nevertheless, 
if the tax shift, any tax shift, influences capital accumulation, a “second-order”, “long-term” 
redistributive effect exists too, and is part of the overall tax incidence. This is at least the viewpoint 
from which this paper approaches the subject matter under investigation. 
The next section examines these considerations formally through a stylized two-period Cournot Monti-
Klein model. The results of this investigation not only corroborate the main thesis of this paper about 
bank indirect-tax induced bank market power to shift the tax forward, but they want it to hold 
regardless bank industry structure. The magnitude of the shift and its effect on capital accumulation 
depends on the extent to which the tax-shift investment disincentive is counterbalanced in the market 
by the effect of the shift-induced money-multiplier increase on the interest rate. Moreover, the 
“standard” proposition that the ability to shift indirect taxation forward depends negatively on the size 
of the elasticity of loan demand, is confirmed here, too. Section 3 is motivated by policy 
considerations, introducing into the discussion lending out of own bank funds. Relating the low 
elasticity of loan demand with relationship banking, and by contemplating thereby that the mix “bank 
indirect tax – relationship banking” may prove to be a factor influencing capital accumulation, a zero-
bank-profit policy or the same, full-reserve requirement is proposed. Indirect taxation is found to lower 
the equity-lending ratio as well, and in this connection, its countercyclical manipulation is proposed, 
too. Section 4 concludes this paper with a discussion on the appropriate policy-making towards the 
banking sector. Countries which do not have such a tax, should take these considerations into account 
in the design of the tax system. 
2. Analysis 
Let there be 𝑁 identical banks, each providing 𝐿 loans, based on 𝐷 deposits, through the bank-money 
multiplier 1 𝑒⁄ , 0 < 𝑒 < 1, so that 𝐷 = 𝑒𝐿, where 𝑒 is the required reserves ratio. The life span of a 
loan is two periods, with ℎ𝐿, 0 < ℎ < 1, of it, remaining to be paid off when period 2 begins; ℎ is 
determined institutionally. The inverse demand function for loans in period 1, 𝑟1(𝐿1), represents the 
interest rate,  𝑟1, borrowers are willing to pay for 𝐿1 so that 𝑟1 = 𝑟1(𝐿1), while the interest rate 
corresponding to period 2, 𝑟2, reflects borrower willingness to pay not only for 𝐿2 but for ℎ𝐿1 too, so 
that 𝑟2 = 𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2). Hence, in the presence of a tax rate 𝑡 on loans, if 𝑖 is the deposit rate, 𝑏 is the 
one-period discount factor, and 𝐶 = 𝛿𝐷 + 𝜆𝐿 is the cost function for the typical bank, with 𝛿 and 𝜆 
being positive parameters, the 𝑛th bank, 𝑛 = 1,2, … , 𝑁, is called for in a Cournot setting to maximize 
profit: 
𝛱 = {[𝑟1(𝐿1) − 𝜆1]𝐿1 − (𝑖1 − 𝛿1)𝐷1 − 𝑡1𝐿1}
+ 𝑏{[𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝜆2](ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − (𝑖2 − 𝛿2)𝐷2 − 𝑡2𝐿2} 
or since 𝐷 = 𝑒𝐿: 
𝛱 = {[𝑟1(𝐿1) − 𝜆1] − 𝑒1(𝑖1 − 𝛿1) − 𝑡1}𝐿1
+ 𝑏{[𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝜆2](ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2)𝐿2 − 𝑡2𝐿2}   (1) 
taking for granted the strategies of the other 𝑁 − 1 banks, where the subscript “𝑛” has been suppressed 
due to the assumption of identical banks. 
Now, note that the first-order condition for the maximization of the second-period profit, 𝛱2 =
[𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝜆2](ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2)𝐿2 − 𝑡2𝐿2, is: 
𝜕𝛱2
𝜕𝐿2
= [𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2) − 𝜆2] + 𝐿2
𝜕𝑟2(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2)
𝜕𝐿2
− 𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2) − 𝑡2 = 0     (2) 
which when solved for 𝐿2, implies that the solution, 𝐿2
∗ , depends on the first-period choice of 𝐿1. If this 
is common knowledge so that first-period borrowers know about it, banks cannot maximize (1) without 
 taking into that borrowers expect (2) and hence, banks are constrained by (2). The impact of this 
constraint on bank’s response to taxation is given by the derivative: 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑡2
= (
𝜕𝐿2
∗
𝜕𝑡2
ℎ𝐿1
∗
𝜕𝑟2
𝜕𝐿2
− 𝑏𝐿2)      (3) 
A priori, both derivatives inside the parentheses should be negative, rendering the whole term to the 
left of −𝐿2 positive and counteracting thereby the negative quantity −𝐿2. Let us, for instance, postulate 
for simplicity a reciprocal interest rate function, 𝑟(∙) ≡ (∙)−1 so that 𝐿2
∗ = (√ℎ𝐿1𝛤 − 𝛤) 𝛤⁄ , with 
ℎ𝐿1 > 𝛤, and 
𝜕𝐿2
∗
𝜕𝑡2
= −
√ℎ𝐿1
2𝛤√𝛤
< 0 
where  𝛤 ≡ 𝑡2 + 𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2) + 𝜆2. 
Consequently, 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑡2
= 𝑏 {[−
√ℎ𝐿1
2𝛤√𝛤
] ℎ𝐿1
∗ [−
1
(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2)2
] − 𝑏𝐿2} (4) 
where  −(ℎ𝐿1 + 𝐿2)
−2 = 𝜕𝑟2 𝜕𝐿2⁄ . 
To understand the meaning of (4) and by extension of (3), note that 𝜕𝛱 𝜕𝑡1⁄ = −𝐿1, that is, the tax in 
period 1 is a pure loss for the bank. The same would be true for period 2 if the positive term to the left 
of −𝑏𝐿2 in (4) and (3) was not there; it is a term which owes to the borrower expectations constraint 
(2) and which might neutralize and even benefit the bank to the extent that it is equal or greater than 𝐿2. 
What is for sure is that the tax in period 2 increases the market power of banks, which might be 
interpreted as bank ability to shift the tax partly or wholly and profit even further just because not all of 
𝐿1 is owned by the bank in period 2. In period 1, before part (1 − ℎ) of the loan has been paid out, the 
bank is burdened by the loan wholly and can do nothing directly to shift the tax. It can do it indirectly, 
however, by letting it affect borrower expectations for period 2: It can simply state in the beginning of 
the loan that no better terms can be offered for the loan because of the tax. In the case of positive (3) or 
(4), not only the whole of 𝑡2 will have been shifted but part of 𝑡1, too. One benchmark case is the 
complete shift of the tax without any further profit, i.e. the case of 𝛱 = 0 in (1) so that: 
𝑡1𝐿1 + 𝑏𝑡2𝐿2 = [(𝑟1 − 𝜆1) + 𝑏ℎ(𝑟2 − 𝜆2) − 𝑒1(𝑖1 − 𝛿1)]𝐿1 + 𝑏[𝑟2 − 𝜆2 − 𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2)]𝐿2.   (5) 
This is marginal-cost pricing inclusive of the tax. The left-hand side of (5) gives the total tax imposed 
on the bank, but shifted to the borrower. The other benchmark case is the zero shift: the tax is imposed 
when 𝑡1𝐿1 + 𝑏𝑡2𝐿2 = 0 in (5) and 𝛱 is reduced exactly by that amount after the levy of the tax. This is 
the case of marginal-cost pricing exclusive of the tax, the case according to which taxation in period 2 
does not confer market power: the bank cannot or does not have an incentive to evoke upon the 
presence of taxation to frustrate borrower interest-rate expectations for period 2. A zero-bank-profit 
policy would achieve just that as discussed in the concluding section, but not before the following 
capital-accumulation considerations are also taken into account: 
If the longevity of a loan is seen from an intergenerational perspective, the shift of the indirect bank tax 
may be attributed to the role of banking as a non-market surrogate of insurance against 
intergenerational liquidity shocks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). The banks exploit this role to shift the 
tax to the current generation, to the businesses mostly signing loan contracts now, thus lowering capital 
accumulation. At the other end, banks have an incentive to lend more. The borrower does understand 
that in view of the tax, the bank should at least break even as under pre-tax marginal cost pricing. And, 
since 𝑡𝛱 < 𝛱 = 0 in any one period, the borrower does understand that there has to be an increase in 
the lending rate for the bank to break even after the tax. But, s/he also senses that taxation strengthens 
the bank’s incentive to lend, because 𝐷 = 𝑒𝐿 => 𝐷 > 𝑡𝑒𝐿. The money multiplier is raised from 1 𝑒⁄  to 
1 𝑡𝑒⁄ , given that both 𝑡 and 𝑒 are less than 1. The additional amount of loans comes out of this increase: 
from the tax money saved through the tax shift, driving the interest rate down. The extent to which the 
rightward shift of the loan supply curve counteracts with the upward pressure that the increased bank 
market power exerts on the interest rate and the subsequent course of capital accumulation, is a matter 
 of empirical considerations. In the case, for example, of the reciprocal interest-rate function, what is for 
sure from the comparison of 𝐿2
∗ = (√ℎ𝐿1𝛤 − 𝛤) 𝛤⁄  with and without the tax 𝑡2, is that the after-tax 
optimal 𝐿2, 𝐿2
∗ , exceeds the pre-tax one, with the comparison being reduced to the inequality: 
2𝛤?̂?√ℎ𝐿1?̂? + 2𝑡2𝛤√ℎ𝐿1?̂? + 𝑡2?̂?(1 − 𝑡2) > 𝑡2ℎ𝐿1𝛤 + 2𝛤√ℎ𝐿1𝛤, 
where ?̂? ≡ 𝛤 − 𝑡2 = [𝑒2(𝑖2 − 𝛿2) + 𝜆2]. The extent of the difference between the two sides of this 
inequality depends on the particular specification of the parameters and variables involved in it. 
If the introduction of the indirect tax alters the pre-tax course of capital accumulation, and if this course 
is the one at steady-state, the tax will be at odds with the efficient Arrow-Debreu intergenerational 
insurer role, which banks are supposed to play. But, if the effects of the tax acts as a stabilizing factor 
as, for instance, by lowering the interest rate under recessionary conditions, the tax will be working 
towards improving efficiency, falsifying those who see in the banking sector only a destabilizing 
influence. Much more so when these results obtain regardless bank industry structure, since the term 
1/(𝑁 + 1), which should accompany individual Cournot bank lending in either period, is found in 
either side of (5) and just cancels out: Under quantity competition, taxation confers market power 
regardless the structure of the banking industry; power in the sense of profit-making out of which taxes 
may be paid and working thereby as a forward shift of the tax. Quantity and in general non-price 
competition is a plausible assumption for the banking sector, given the concern of the state with the 
interest rates.  
3. Policy Considerations 
The point is that increased market power signifies increased price mark-up; and part of the increased 
price has been taken above to be covering partly or wholly the indirect bank tax, having per se this tax-
shift an adverse effect on capital accumulation. And, two are the points that need to be made in 
connection with policy-making to the extent that the tax-shift induced increase of the money-multiplier 
cannot reverse this adversity: First, note that by multiplying and dividing (3) with 𝐿2 𝑟2⁄ , (3) becomes: 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑡2
= (
𝜕𝐿2
∗
𝜕𝑡2
ℎ
𝐿1
∗
𝐿2
∗
𝑟2
𝜎2
− 𝑏𝐿2), 
where 𝜎2 is the elasticity of the demand for 𝐿2, thus confirming the “standard” proposition that the 
ability to shift indirect taxation forward depends negatively on the size of the elasticity of loan demand. 
Consequently, the tax burden is likely to be borne by low demand elasticity borrowers. Such are surely 
the elasticity conditions forged by relationship banking. Privileged banking protects from adverse 
business conditions (Berlin and Mester 1999), and the “protected” firm might be viewing the bank tax 
shift as an additional intertemporal insurance premium. And, note that nowadays, good business is 
identified with such banking. Now, if this mutual firm-bank understanding is actually the case, and if 
there is a discrepancy between the firm-bank private interest and the societal good of higher capital 
accumulation and growth: Should the government regulate against relationship banking?  
This is the question prompting the second point that needs to be made with regard to policy-making. 
The answer to it is a matter of (dis)incentives, for which critical within the context of our model is the 
role of the reserve requirement ratio, 𝑒.  Note that from (5), the smaller 𝑒 is, the less revenue the bank 
needs to break even before the tax ceteris paribus, the easier thereby to collect this revenue, the easier a 
tax shift would become and hence, once full tax shift is possible, the larger the tax that might be 
shifted. Therefore, the answer to the above question would be in the affirmative only if the government 
was postulating a full-reserve requirement, since in this manner, neither the bank nor the firm would 
have an incentive to commit to privileged banking. But, note that as mentioned in the last section in a 
discussion of (5) too, a zero-bank-profit policy would have the same outcome, indeed, because what is 
sought by either policy is the zeroing of commercial bank seigniorage (see e.g. Soldatos and Varelas 
2014). This “mandate” is in the spirit of the pre-WWII, non-monetarist, Chicago School of Thought, 
because “[t]he fixing of the quantity of circulating media is attractive as a principle of monetary policy 
for several reasons…” (Simons 1936, p. 5).  
And, there does exist room for policy intervention given the evidence for bank indirect-tax shift 
mentioned in the introductory section. The shift induced loan supply expansion does not appear to be 
 outweighing the interest rate increase brought about by increased bank market power to shift the tax. 
How could when the interest rate is too low to be contemplating further reduction in connection with 
the tax shift? One reason for the current trend of the interest rate is the weak connection of the reserve 
requirement ratio with modern banking business and hence, of the money multiplier in determining 
lending expansion and the market interest rate. Under these circumstances, a zero-bank-profit policy 
intervention becomes meritless, let alone the fact that such an intervention is seen nowadays as 
outdated. But, these are circumstances placing the emphasis on financial discipline and bank 
supervision rather than on the macroeconomic role of banking. This is the reason for the limited 
nowadays role of 𝑒 and for the current unpopularity of a zero-bank-profit rule. This change of emphasis 
on policy might had been in the right direction given that neither tax-shifts would have been 
documented under a near liquidity-trap interest rate, since 𝜎2 (and 𝜎1?) above would have been 
effectively zero. Yet, the tax shift exists and is unrelated with the trends in the interest rate, because 
policy preoccupation with depositor insurance (esp. Basel Agreement) has led to lending influenced 
greatly by bank own capital, with the equity-lending ratio being regulated inappropriately in so far as 
the macroeconomía is concerned. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue among others that high capital 
requirements reduce monitoring incentives and decrease the quality of banks’ assets while Blum (1999) 
adds that they also increase the value of future profits for banks and induce banks to more risk taking. 
The fact is that banks lend today based on a multiple of their equity rather than on any reserve 
requirement ratio; a regulated multiple mismatching macroeconomic trends, which explains why 
increased lending cannot take away bank market power. 
 
That regulatory intervention is to blame for the trends contradicting our theoretical predictions, may be 
easily seen by introducing into the analysis some deposit insurance premium, 𝑃, and own bank funds, 
𝐸, so that 𝐿 + 𝑃 = 𝐷 + 𝐸. If 𝑞 is the probability of loan repayment, 𝑃 = 𝐷 + 𝐸 − 𝐿 has to be equal to 
(1 − 𝑞)𝐷 so that 𝐷 + 𝐸 − 𝐿 = (1 − 𝑞)𝐷 =>  
𝐿 = 𝑞𝐷 + 𝐸    (6) 
 
for the bank to break even, ceteris paribus. Moreover, shareholders’ value 
 
𝑃{[𝑟(𝐿) − 𝜆]𝐿 − (𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷} ≥ 𝑞{[𝑟(𝐿) − 𝜆]𝐿 − (𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷}     (7) 
 
or 
 
𝐿 ≥
(𝑖 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑞)
(𝑃 − 𝑞)[𝑟(𝐿) − 𝜆]
𝐷    (8) 
 
to ensure the continuation of bank’s operations. Solving (8) for D, inserting the result (with the equality 
sign) in (6), and dividing by 𝐿, yields that:  
 
𝑘 = 1 −
𝑞(𝑃 − 𝑞)[𝑟(𝐿) − 𝜆]
(𝑖 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑞)
       (9) 
 
while multiplying 𝐿 in (7) by 𝑡, and proceeding with the same operations, one obtains that: 
𝑘 = 1 −
𝑡𝑞(𝑃 − 𝑞)[𝑟(𝐿) − 𝜆]
(𝑖 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑞)
  
 
which is clearly less than the 𝑘 in (9) given that 𝑡 < 1. The introduction of indirect taxation lowers 
rather than raises the multiple 𝑘 of loans based on bank own funds, as it should be the case given the 
increase in the money multiplier. So, if the opposite actually happened in reality, it should be attributed 
purely to the regulation of 𝑘.2 A regulation disregarding the message of these considerations that better 
than financial discipline and bank supervision appears to be that fiscal policy which is based on 
raising/lowering indirect taxation as an instrument of boosting/restraining the economy during 
recession/inflation. Much more so when as Blum and Hellwig (1995) caution, capital requirements 
manipulation appears to amplify cyclical fluctuations. Handling bank indirect taxation in a 
countercyclical manner would too be in the spirit of non-monetarist Chicago School, complementing 
the zero-bank-profit rule, if it was undertaken within the broader context of a cyclically balanced 
budget. 
 
4. Discussion 
  
To sum up, the durable-goods character of loans enables the forward shift of bank indirect taxes à la 
Coase (1972), increasing thereby the money multiplier and reducing the equity-lending ratio. 
Consequently, policymakers may use such taxes countercyclically if, of course, the need for depositor 
insurance is not exaggerated evoking upon the microeconomic problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard before and after lending, respectively. These problems may be severe, indeed. Guillaume (2013) 
argues, for example, that moral hazard may be accompanied by ex post adverse selection, with the ex 
ante incentives for effort to be interacting with ex post incentives to misreport to the lending bank, 
impeding subsequently the design of any optimal contract. Deposits will be in jeopardy if cases like 
this become widespread, and financial discipline and/or bank supervision should be sought policy-wise. 
Nevertheless, what really puts depositors at risk is that if it is costly to enforce loan contracts, 
borrowing capacity will become limited, and the need to relax credit constraints on the part of the 
borrowing firm, may give rise to the so-called “financial accelerator” of amplifying macroeconomic 
fluctuations (see e.g. Liu and Wang 2014). So, a policy towards the banking sector should be as much 
microeconomics minded as macroeconomic-stability oriented. This is the principle according to which 
bank indirect taxation should be treated given the sizeable effect of this taxation on the monetary 
economy. A principle admittedly having always in mind that “regulatory policy motivated only by 
macroeconomic goals may destroy banks by preventing them from providing the services that are the 
raison d'être of banks…[and may] go so far as to suggest implicitly that we have no need for banks at 
all since banks can be replaced by other existing institutions (e.g., mutual funds)” (Diamond and 
Dybvig 1986, p. 56). 
 
Footnotes 
1 If, at the other end, interest rate increases rather than decreases are expected, the shortest 
possible loan duration will be pursued by the borrower ceteris paribus, inducing thereby the bank to 
internalize the tax. 
2It is noteworthy that introducing a tax 𝜏 on shareholders’ value in (8), 𝜏 would cancel out and 
would not subsequently alter 𝑘, confirming from still another perspective the traditional thesis that 
income taxation does not affect incentives. 
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